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Summary
l.Subject ofthe studS,. The cross-border activities ofEuropean - and non-European
- businesses have increased significantly over the last few decades. Not only large,
but also medium-sized and small businesses expand their territory across the
border. The typical form of the multinational enterprise is the group of companies,
a cluster of legally independent companies organisationally linked together in one
economic unit. An enterprise may expand its activities across the border by
establishing a branch office or a by incorporating a subsidiary under the law of the
host country. In practice the latter option is the most frequently chosen. Unlike a
branch office, a subsidiary incorporated under the law of the host country will not
be hindered by legal 'problems of adaptation'. The most important advantage of the
group structure is, however, that it enables the parent company to create bulkheads,
rvhich prevent the whole group from sinking if one member is 'flooded'. The group
structure is used to limit risks to specific members of the group.
The area oftension between the various separate legal entities on the one hand and
the image of a single economic entity on the other hand has given rise to a number
of legal questions, to most of which a satisfactory answer has not yet been found.
The "perhaps most controversial issue of group law"' is directly linked to the
possibility of linritation of liability just mentioned. The question under which
circurnstances the parent company may be held liable for debts of the subsidiary has
intrigued - and stil l intrigues - many lawyers all over the world.
As a member of a group the subsidiary will have to accept hat its interests may be
subordinated o the interests of the group as a whole. The subsidiary's assets will
not be used exclusively to cover its own liablities, but they will be made available
tothe rvhole group. It is therefore hardly surprising that when a creditor does not
rcceive payment from a subsidiary, the question crops up, whether the principle of
limited liability applies without exception to group relationships, or whether
corporate v ils may be cast aside, so that the creditor can recover his claim from the
parent. Even in a straightforward 'domestic' case, it will not be easy to answer this
question. The courts cannot jr.rst take away with one hand what the legislator or the
courts themselves have given with the other. This is made perfectly clear in the
following passage quoted frorn a judgment of the English Court of Appeal:
"We do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the
corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a
corporate group, merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to
ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of
l, L. lrmmenrran, Over multinationale ondcrnemingen en medezeggenschap van werknerners (On
Multinational enterprises and co-deternrination ofworkers), p. 76.
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the group (and correspondingty the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fatl
on antoher nember of the group rather than that company. Wrether or not this
is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this rvay is inherent in our
corporate law."2
And yet there are lirnits to the right to limit liability, as there are limits to the
exercise of any other right. Each of the legal systems included in this study provides
for techniques rvhich can be used to make a parent company liable for debts of its
subsidiary. In a straightforward 'domestic' case the lawyer will only have to
establish which technique can be used to pierce the corporate veil. The case
becomes more cornplicated if parent and subsidiary are domiciled in different
countries. In a cross-border veil-piercing case four questions must be answered
succesively:
l. Which is the competent court?
2. Which law appl ies?
3. Does the applicable law allow the corporate veilto be pierced?
4. Can the judgment be enforced abroad?
Up to norv only the third - substantive - issue has been dealt with extensively in
Dutch legal writing. The other - conflicts of law - issues have rrot received much
attention. altlrough it is evident that in a study of veil-piercing in corporate groups,
conflicts of larv issues cannot be avoided:
"..., intra-group Iiability problerns raised by creditors of insolvent subsidiaries
of a foreign-based group entail inevitably, by definition, private and procedural
international legal implications: the issues of the appropriate choice of lawto
determine the liability of the foreign parent for the satisfaction of the rights of
creditors of a bankrr-rpt subsidiary and of in rem and personal jurisdiction of the
couft a qr-ro (not to mention the problem of enforcement of foreign judgments)
thus come inescapably to the foreground, holding a sort of legal priority
regardi ng any type of substantive l gal considerations."r
In Dr-rtcl-r and foreign legal writing the satne spectacular cases always feature as
e.ran.rples of cross-border veil piercing. Aftention is focused on environmental
disasters, like the case of the shipwrecked oil tanker Amoco Cadiza or the tragic
case of the chemical leak in Bhopal, which led to the loss of many lives. Recently,
another environmental case was headline-news in Eneland and Narnibia. A former
2. Adants v ( 'apc Industr ics !991I I  Al l  l -R 929.
3. . l . l j .  Antunes. Liabi l i ty of Corporate Croups, 1994, p.233
1. Strictll' spcaking. this rvas not a case of inte mational piercing, as the subsidiary and the parent rvere
btrth based in thc tJnited States. 'l'he intenrational elenrent in this case is that the oil rvas pilled on
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employee of a Narnibian uranium mine is suing the English parent company for
damages because he has contracted a uranium-related disease.5 A spectacular case
of a different nature is the notorious collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International. One of the greatest diffrculties in this international group insolvency
is that he financial affairs of the various members of the group are so closely knit,
that it is almost impossible to establish exactly which assets belong to which
company. For that reason a few cooperating liquidators have proposed to pool the
assets of some mernbers of the group.
Drawing from Dutch experience a few cases can be mentioned, which may be less
spectacular than the ones mentioned above, but which are just as interesting from
a legal point of view. In the Osby-case, an unpaid creditor of the insolvent Dutch
subsidiary claimed that the Srvedish parent company had acted negligently in
creating the false impression that the subsidiary was creditworthy. Also worth
mentioning is the Banco di Roma case, in which the creditor of a Dutclr subsidiary
succeeded in preventing the ltalian parent from withdrawing assets from the
subsidiary, b  obtaining injunctive relief in sulnmary proceedings.
2. Method ttsed and delineution of the ,rubject. The study is divided into two parts:
acomparative parl and an part in which conflicts of law issues are dealt with. The
foundations for the second part are laid in the first. In the first part Dutch law is
compared with the laws of three other European countries: Belgium, Cermany and
England. In order to keep the size of the study within reasonable bounds, elaborate
general observations on group law have not been included. After a short
introduction, each national chapter focuses on the techniques which can be used to
make the parent company liable for debts of the subsidiary. The study has been
limrted to techniques which may lead to l iabil i ty of the parent company. Other
techniques, like the rules on transactions at an undervalue and unfair preferences.
have not been included, with the exception of the German rules on subordination
ofshareholder loans.
Theanalysis of case law forms the backbone of the first part of the study. The
author takes the view that case law deserves this leading part, as the courts have
greatly influenced the law in the field of piercing the veil in all four countries
included in the study. Another reason tbr focusing on case law is that the author
I intends to draw a picture of ' law in practice'. In order to show how veil-piercing
works inpractice, a thorough analysis of case law is indispensible.
Thesecond part of the study is of a more theoretical nature. It leans - more strongly
than the first part - on Dr"rtch and foreign legal doctrine, as the number of relevant
reported cases is limited. Consequently, the second part of the study is more
speculative han the first. Another dil'ference with the first part is that the second
part focuses on Dutch law. The conflicts of law study has been limited to the
questions which arise when a Dutch court has to deal with an international veil
J riouseof l-ords 24.luly 1997, Connelly v RTZ Corporation PLC and Othcrs U99714 All ER 335.
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piercing case. The objective is to establish which Dutch rules of international
procedural and private law apply to a cross-border veil piercing case. Nevertheless,
the comparative rnethod also plays a part in the second part of the study. The Dutch
rules on international jurisdiction are - to a large extent - based on the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements (hereafter Brussels
Convention). This Convention has also been adopted by the other countries
included in this study. When interpreting the rules of the Convention, the European
Court of Justice uses the cornparative method. It is of equal importance to look at
other laws when designing conflict rules. In order to avoid clashes and loopholes
betrveen the national conflict rules, one has to take into account how similar cases
are dealt  lv i th in ot[rer countr ies.
3. The purpose o.f tlte study.The comparative part of the study serves two purposes.
The first is a purpose which is common to all comparative studies. In order to judge
national larv on its merits one has to look at the solutions provided by other legal
systems. The second - more specific - purpose of the comparative study is that it
enables the author to assess the possibilities of harmonisation of the rules
concerning roup liability in the EU. The assessment departs from the proposals
which were recently put forward by the Forum Europaeurn Konzernrecht, an
international working groLrp of leading experts in the field of group larv.u It is the
author's view that the possibilities for harmonisation are lirnited (vide nr. 4). This
rneans that issues of conflicts of law will not - at least not in the near future -
become less important. It is submitled that these issues are only likely to gain
itrtpoftance, taking into account hat more businesses expand their territory across
the national border every year. Therefore, a closer look at the way in which a cross-
border piercing case should be dealt with by a Dutch court seems justified. The
second part of the str"rdy is dedicated to conflicts of law issues. In this part, the
author sets out to answer two quest ions:
I ) Under rvlrat rules rnay the Dutch court take jurisdiction and how should tlrese
rules be applied in specific cases?
2) According to what conflict rules should the Dutch court determine the applicable
Iaw and how sl-rould these rules be applied in particular cases?
4. Conclusion.r. The conclusions of the first part of the study can be found in the
comparative synthesis (Chapter 5). This chapter contains an elaborate analysis of
the most striking similarities and differences between the systems tudied, as well
as an assessrïlenÍ of the possibilities forharmonisation of laws in this field.lnthis
sumrnary only a short overview of the most important conclusions can be given.
6. Forurn Europaeum Konzemrecht, Konzernrecht Íiir Europa (Ciroup Law tbr Europe), ZGR I998,
p . 6 7 2 - 1 1 2 .
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In all legal systerns included in the study liability of the parent company for debts
of the subsidiary is usually based on fault. There are only a few exceptions to this
rule.
In all legal systems tudied piercing the veil by the courts (without a statutory basis)
is seen as an ultimum remedium (last resort). This technique is only used in clear-
cut cases of abuse of limited liability.
AII legal systems studied provide for liability of the parent in case of wrongful
trading, For a claim to succeed, it is necessary to establish that the parent was
intensively involved in the insolvent subsidiary's affairs. The plaintiff must prove
that the parent has acted as a shadow dírector. The national rules on wrongful
trading diflèr considerably in some important aspects. This might prove an obstacle
to eventual harmonisation of these rules.
All systems studied provide for possibilities to hold the parent liable for
undercapitalising thesubsidiary. In this field, the rules differ even more than the
rules on wrongful trading. The most stringent provisions can be found in Germany,
where loans granted by the parent may under certain circumstances be subordinated
to the other debts in case of insolvency of the subsidiary.
There is a marked difference between the Netherlands and the other countries
included in the study, where the role of tort law is concerned. In the Netherlands,
a claim based on negligence is the technique 'par excellence' to hold a parent
company liable for debts of the subsidiary. The strength of Dutch tort law is its
flexibility, which has enabled the Dutch courts to 'solve' a number of very different
veil-piercing cases by using this technique.
Group liability and problems of burden of proof are inseparable. ln all countries
studied lawyers wrestle with the question what exactly should be established by the
plaintiff in a veil-piercing case. Practice shows that it may be extremely difficult to
prove that the parent knew that creditors of the subsidiary would be harmed by its
act (or omission). Creditors usually do not possess the detailed financial
imformation necessary to discharge their burden of proof. It is submitted by the
author that the plaintiff s burden may be lightened by imposing a duty on the parent
toclarify the subsidiary's financial state of affairs at the time of the litigious act (or
omission). Especially when the parent company qualifies as a shadow director, it
is reasonable to expect it to provide information regarding the subsidiary's financial
$ate of affairs. For the same can be expected of formally appointed irectors.
It is the author's view that the possibilities for harmonisation are limited. Perhaps
the rules on wrongful trading can be harmonised, as suggested by the forum
Europaeum Konzernrecht, although the differences in existing national aws will
not make this an easy project. It is submitted that the eventual harmonisation of
rvrongful trading provisions should not be limited to group relationships,
considering that rvrongful trading is not a problem unique to groups of companies.
J  / t
- )  t + Summary
The second part of the study has led to the following conclusions.
The Brussels Convention 1968 and the Lugano Convention 19887 are not
applicable to clairns against a foreign parent based on art.2:248 of the Dutch Civil
Code ((shadow) director's liability in case of insolvency). This means that the
Dutclr court may take jurisdiction on the basis of art. 126 para 3 of the Dutch Code
of Civil Procedure (this article provides for jurisdiction of the 'exorbitant' forum
actctris). The answer will stay the same, should the EC Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings (hereafter: E,C Insolvency Convention) enter into force. This
Convention only provides for the enfbrcement of judgments concerning claims
closely connected to insolvency proceedings, but it does not contain any rules on
jurisdiction with regard to such claims. The EC Insolvency Convention only lays
down rules regarding jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.lt leaves open
the question which court may take jurisdiction in case of a claim based on director's
liability in case of insolvency. It is sr"rbmitted that this lacuna should be fil led.
The claim based on arL.2:248 DCC is governed by the lex concursus. This means
that, if insolvency proceedings have been started against a subusidiary in the
Netherlands, a claim based on art.248 against he foreign parent will be governed
by Dutch law.
ln case ofa claim based on negligence against a parent based outside the territory
of the Brussels Convention, the Dutch court may take jurisdiction under art. 126
para 3 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. If the parent is based within the
territory of the Brussels Convention, the Dutch court may take jurisdiction under
aft. 5 (3) of the Brussels Convention. This rule provides for jurisdiction of the court
of the place "where the harmful event occurred". If the place of acting
(Handlungsort) and the place where the act made its first impact (Erfolgsort) do not
coincide, the plaintiff may choose whether he brings the claim before the forum of
the Handlungsoft or the forum of the Erfolgsort. It is sLrbmitted that this option is
also available if the loss sustained by the plaintiff is direcÍ and primary economic
lo:;s.
ln the COVA-case8 tlre Dutch Hoge Raad decided that tort cases is govemed by:
I ) the law parties have chosen;
2) in the absence of choice of law: the law of the country where both plaintiff and
defendant reside;
3) in the absence of a cornmon residence: the law of the country where the tort was
committed.
ln the Íbllorving I rvill only mention the Brussels Convention, as the provisions ofboth conventions
arc almost  s imi lar .
I loge Raad I 9 I)cccmber | 993, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie I 994, 622. For a case-comnrenl in
English, see: H. Duintjer Tebbens, Choice of Law in Torr, Netherlands Intemational Law Review
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The important question which law applies if Handlungsort and Erfolgsort do not
coincide has not been answered in this case. It is submitted that the law of the
Erfolgsort should be applied if the act made its first impact in another country than
the country where the act rvas committed. In case of direct and primary economic
loss the most practical solution is to locate the Erfolgsort at the plaintiffls residence.
It is of equal importance for determining jurisdiction and for determining the
applicable aw to know where Handlungsort and Erfolgsort can be located in
specific veil-piercing cases. lt is suggested by the author that in the five most
impoftant cases of negligence in parent-subsidiary-relationshipsn, the HandlungsoÍ
and the ErÍblgsort should be located in the following way.
a) ln case the parent acts negligently in allowing furtlrer trading when the subsidiary
is insolvent, he Handlungsort should be located where the contract with the
plaintiff was entered into. The Erfolgsort in this case is the plaintiff s domicile.
b) In case a parent has acted negligently in allowing the insolvent subsidiary to
prefer a payment o another member of the group, the Handlungsort is the place
where the payment was rnade. This will usually coincide with the seat of the
subsidiary. The principle of equaltreatment of creditors entails that the Erfolgsort
should be located at the place of business of the subsidiary. It is submitted that,
because th  general body ofcreditors has suffered economic loss as a consequence
of the preferential payment, the Erfolgsort should not be located at the various
individual creditor's residences. This may lead to unequal treatment of creditors.
c)In case a parent has acted negligently in withdrawing assets from a subsidiary,
the location of the Handlungsorl depends very much on the facts of the case. For
the same reasons set out above in the context of preferential payments, the
Erfolgsort should be located at the subsidiary's place ofbusiness, rather than the
various domiciles of the individual creditors.
d)lf the parent was negligent by creating the false impression that the subsidiary
was creditworthy, the Handlungsort should be located at the subsidiary's eat. The
Erfolgsort should be located at the unpaid creditor's residence.
e)lf the parent is held liable on the grounds of negligent statement (suggesting that
the parent will cover the subsidiary's debts), the Handlungsort isthe place where
the statement was made. The Erfolgsort should be located at the unpaid creditor's
tesidence, for this is a case of individual economic loss, like the previous case.
9. These are all cases which have been decided bv the Dutch Hose Raad
376 Sumntarv
When the court is faced with a case in which it seems justif ied to pierce the
corporate veil because abuse has been made of the right to l irnit l iabil i ty,
iurisdiction should be detennined on the basis of the underlying claim, which wil l
usually be a claim based on contract or on tort. This means that the Dutch court
nray takejurisdiction in case ofa claim against a parent based outside the territory
of the Brussels Convention according ïo 126 para 3 of the Dutch Code on Civil
Procedure. lf the parent is based within the territory of the Brussels Convention,
.jurisdiction can be based on the articles 2,5 (l) (in case of a contractual claim) or
5 (3) (in case of a claim based on tort) of the Convention. Art.6 (1) may be used
to bring a clairn against the parent before tlre court of the domicile of the subsidiary,
Aft. 5 (5; can only be Lrsed to bring the foreign parent before a Dutch forum if the
subsidiary has created the impression that she was acting on behalf of the parent
company.
' l-he question which court has jurisdiction to pierce veils in a group insolvency, with
the result that the insolvency proceedings are consolidated, can be ansrvered simply
by saying: none. The answer wil l be no different, should the EC Insolvency
Convention enter into force. This Convention does not provide for specific rules for
group insolvencies. It also adheres to the principle that in case of a group
insolvency, each group company wil l be subjected to separate insolvency
proceedings. lt is the author's view that at least a duty to cooperate slrould have
been adopted in this treaty. both for liquidators of companies belonging to the sarne
group and for the different national courts supervising the various group members'
insolvencies. lt goes without saying that as long as procedural consolidation across
the borders rerrrains impossible, substantive consolidation stays out of sight
altogether. The author takes the view that a regulation of cross-border substantive
consolidation in group insolvencies can only meaningfully be discussed when
national insolvency laws lrave been harmonised.
It is submitted that the issue, whether the court may pierce the corporate veil
because the privilege of I irnited l iabil i ty has been abused, is governed by the lex
societatis.The author is not in favour of giving the plaintiff the right to opt for the
lex causae. should this prove to be more favourable than the lex societatis. It is the
author's view that direct veil-piercing by the courts should only be allowed in cases
of cornrningling of assets, rvlrere it is irnpossible to establish which assets belong
to which corrpany. In these cases, the principle of equal treatment of creditors
entails that the question whether the corporate veil may be pierced should be
governed by one lex societatis, rather than subiecting it to different leges causae.
